We show how institutional arrangements, which consist of contracting, ownership and social elements, tie together the joint profits, or efficiency, of the marketing system.
INTRODUCTION ...without the appropriate institutions, no market economy of any significance is possible.
Ronald H. Coase, Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture in Economic Science (1991) Coase's Nobel lecture views institutions as vital elements of a modern economy. In fact, early research in marketing focused on institutions as central to the marketing process (e.g., Alderson, 1965) . Briefly, institutions are the "rules of the game" by which players, including individuals and organizations, 1 interact in exchange ties-be they social or economic. The largely exogenous institutional environment (IE) surrounding an exchange is distinguished from the largely endogenous institutional arrangement (IA) that the parties deploy to support an exchange (Davis and North, 1971) . The IE consists of the formal and informal rules emanating from the macro-level aspects of a society, including the polity, the judicial system, cultural norms, and kinship patterns. The IE is slow to change and defines the world in which firms and people interact. The IA consists of the formal and informal micro-level rules of exchange devised by specific parties to a specific exchange. They represent the arrangements firms and individuals make to facilitate specific exchanges.
IAs can consist of a number of formal and informal components and will possess contractual, ownership, and social characteristics. The commission component of a salesforce incentive compensation plan would represent a contractual element to the IA between a firm and its sales employees. Property rights and decision making authority claims, such those possessed by a partner in a law firm, would represent the ownership character of IAs. Finally, the most intangible and complex part of the IA would be social components, which will be made up of relational and reputational elements. The private and personal networks in Asian business society-known as "guanxi"-are a classic example of a relational IA, while Microsoft's less than soft handling of software firms not fully endorsing the Windows standard is an example of the reputational side of an IA.
As noted above, marketing scholars have long studied the impact of these rules on the exchange process. However, this early institutional school was largely descriptive, and, in common with more recent work on institutions, did not cumulatively lead to a productive stream of scholarly work. Instead, over the past two decades, economics, strategy and marketing scholars have developed very productive research programs centered primarily around the firm's resource allocation decisions (the decision-theoretic view) and its interactions with other firms (the game-theoretic view). Recently, at least three significant changes have refocused our attention on the role of institutions-the limitations of existing theoretical approaches, the globalization of markets, and the blurring of boundaries between public and private organizations.
There is a growing realization that both the decision-theoretic and game-theoretic views provide a limited picture of contemporary management practice where an emphasis on "changing the rules of the game" has become more prevalent (D'Aveni, 1994) . A simple illustration is the shift in our thinking about inventory policy in supply chains. Much of the post-war work focused on developing increasingly more sophisticated inventory models in a decision-theoretic tradition.
More recent approaches, by emphasizing designing supply chains with (virtually) no inventory through rapid replenishment practices such as "efficient consumer response" and "quick response", turn this idea around completely. These practices do not rest on more advanced inventory modeling, but instead involve changing the rules of the game about such things as who controls inventory ordering and releases. Bergen and Iyer (1997) show that such changes do not occur automatically or transparently. Rather, cooperation between self-interested parties must be achieved by re-designing the IA. Institutions are particularly germane to such modern management practices since their central role is to induce cooperation (North, 1990) . However, we have little systematic knowledge about how to choose the right IA. Most critically, we lack a criterion by which designers of institutional structures can compare alternative IAs in terms of firm profitability and marketing system value.
Returning to the list above, as businesses continue to generate larger portions of their profits from global and international markets, the range and diversity of the IEs under which they operate continue to increase. The transition experiences of the Eastern European economies and the current economic difficulties of the East Asian "tigers" are forceful reminders about the impact of IEs on management practices. Both the collapse of the socialist system and the difficulties of economic and social transition, as well as the problems with "crony capitalism" are attributed largely to the poor state of IEs (Devinney, 1998) . Although marketing scholars have argued in general terms about the importance of macro-level institutions in achieving economic progress (e.g., Hunt, 1997) , we have made little headway into incorporating the IE into the choice of specific IAs beyond exhortations that context and cultures matter. Most critically, we lack analytic typologies that disclose the IE's constraints on IA choices.
Finally, public-private partnerships are blurring the distinctions between for-profit and non-profit marketing and management. Privatization and market-driven initiatives are being introduced into these highly politicized settings, yet, little work has focused on the interactions between the IE and the IA in these settings. Firms find themselves grappling with an expanding group of stakeholders who emphasize, not profits, but socially responsible issues such as human rights, environmentalism, child labor, and workplace rights. Within this environment, IAs that are economically efficient may nevertheless fail to account for the plethora of claimants to the social rents of the firm. Most critically, we lack an understanding of institutional efficiency as it pertains to settings where profits are less important.
Goals of the Paper
We integrate and synthesize recent developments from organizational analysis, economics, and political science to create a framework to guide institutional design, particularly as it applies to the marketing activities necessary to deliver end-customer value. To accomplish this, we place institutional design within the context of a value system. Figure 1 illustrates one such system, which consists of all the activities undertaken to deliver value to the end-customer. The bottom panel of the figure (labeled business functions) is a traditional Porter value system that is linked to the three major dynamic activities of marketing-product development, customer acquisition, and 
Insert Figure 1 Here
The key observation that accompanies the value system is that certain activities are internal to the "focal" firm while its partners undertake others. Hence, it is the system that delivers value. Yet, the cost of each activity is typically borne by a firm individually. Likewise, while value is derived from the total margin produced by the system, the rules of the game in the system determine how this total margin is split into margins for each firm. As we see later, this translation of total system margin and costs into own-firm profit is crucial to designing institutions 4 which result in the most efficient activities being independently implemented by each firm in the system.
Also apparent in Figure 1 are the large number of interfaces critical to marketing (indicated by arrows 2 ), which has always been considered a boundary-spanning function. Each solid arrow represents an exchange of product, resources, information and effort which is governed by an IA. Each is also affected by an IE that surrounds the entire value system. The design of these IAs, under relevant IEs, is the heart of our paper.
Organization of Paper
The subsequent sections pose and answer a series of questions. The next section develops the conceptual background. It explores the role of institutional arrangements in creating efficient value systems that simultaneously maximize the joint profit created in the value system and the own-firm profits of each firm. We observe that our institutional orientation is more comprehensive than either a decision-theoretic or a game-theoretic orientation, and suggest a remediable efficiency criterion for comparing rival institutional arrangements on the basis of the activity sets they allow to be implemented.
We then assemble these conceptual building blocks into an operational framework for institutional design. Our approach directs managers to start simple and increase the complexity of the institutions they devise as the complexity of the exchange and deficiencies in the institutional environment mount. The paper closes with some thoughts about empirical research agendas and guidelines for managers.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND Efficiency, Joint Profits, and Own-Firm Profits
Fundamentally, the strategic marketing process consists of selecting the most efficient set of activities to perform in a value system given the needs of targeted customers. Efficiency is often misunderstood to refer solely to minimization of out-of-pocket costs. In fact, efficiency defines the level of joint profits in the value system relative to an upper bound or "fully efficient"
state. Under this construction, efficiency is enhanced by a reduction in out-of-pocket costs, as well as by an increase in revenues (i.e. "effectiveness"), which may be viewed as reducing the opportunity costs of foregone trade. Our usage of the term is common in economics, but differs from the "efficiency vs. effectiveness" language found in the managerial literature.
What complicates the implementation of efficient activities in the strategic marketing process is that what is "best" is usually judged by each firm according to its own profit.
Since the activity set chosen by each firm affects the profits of all the firms in the system, each firm has an incentive to improve their own profit by offering to reallocate profits to other firms to compensate/motivate them to adopt activity sets in the former firm's interest. This is trivial if the new activity set in question improves all firms' profits without reallocation. Such
Pareto-improving choices will be adopted without exception, but for issues of differential perceptions and interpretations of the same data by different firms.
But consider the scenario where a focal firm wishes to get the other firms to adopt activity sets that increase its own profit but which decrease other firms' profits under the existing rules of the game. For example, consider a move to a quick response supply system. Here, manufacturers are asked to respond faster, allowing retailers to order closer in time to customer demand. This lowers retailers' costs by reducing their markdowns and unsold goods, but more responsive, more frequent deliveries increase manufacturers' distribution and billing costs. Should such activity sets be implemented? According to the traditional economic view, the answer is yes so long as the joint profits under the new activity set is greater than the extant activity set. Economists assume that side-payments or other monetary reallocation schemes will emerge automatically so that each and every firm is made better off. Thus, Coase (1960) sets forth the straw-man (later dubbed the "Coase Theorem") that the incumbent positions of the parties is immaterial to the final choices provided that reallocation can be conducted without cost.
But will these activity sets be implemented when reallocation is not automatic and must be managed (as noted by Coase)? The core argument of our thesis is that such efficient activity sets will be implemented only when the reallocation of profits is supported by the IE and IA such that joint profit maximization is aligned with own-firm profit maximization for each firm. To illustrate in the context of quick response supply systems, Bergen and Iyer (1997) show that if the retailer would agree to a new contractual element in the IA, viz., to commit to order volumes under a take-or-pay contract, both parties can be made better off under quick response.
Notice the key elements that emerge as relevant: (1) the new set of activities to be implemented by each firm must be identified and described (in this case, the manufacturer needed to re-engineer to deliver faster); (2) the new set of activities must increase joint profits (which in this case arises from being able to match supply and demand better), and (3) each firm is actually compensated in some manner for implementing these activities (which in this case is accomplished by the switch to contractually committed purchase volumes by the retailer).
Perhaps the key role of institutions is at point (3) (the sharing of rents). Thus, the relevant question in this example is: Will the new contractual elements introduced to the IA, be feasible?
That depends on the IE; in this instance, the availability of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and an independent, impartial judiciary to give the parties confidence that they can enforce the contractual element of the new IA, viz. the committed purchase volumes. However, in fragile
IEs, such as in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, the ability to implement an efficient contract is seriously compromised by the failure of the IE to create an environment where the parties are confident about their claims on the rents from the arrangement.
Notice that both the IA and IE are responsible for making reallocations feasible.
The Role of Power
In seeming contrast to the reallocation/efficiency view, sociologists and political scientists aver strongly to the view that powerful incumbents will act to protect their positions regardless of the consequences for efficiency. (For example, see McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz's (1993) analysis of the origins of the American electric power industry). How do we accommodate the power of incumbents into the efficiency view?
The distribution of power in the incumbent IA influences the division of the gains from proposed new activity sets. Powerful partners will be in a position to just compensate other firms for implementing desired activities, whereas systems composed of equally powerful partners will share gains more evenly. For example, a powerful retailer like Wal-Mart may just compensate a small supplier for adopting efficient inventory control systems, but it will surely retain most of the gains beyond this minimal compensation.
However, such an unequal distribution of gains does not break the tie between efficiency and own-firm profits as long as each firm is not forcibly compelled to implement activities. In other words, each firm's participation constraint must be satisfied-or equivalently, the firm must be no worse off, in the long run, for choosing to engage in a particular set of activities. This is true of voluntary business ties, even when the power of the parties is highly unbalanced. In the In the US, Brickley, Dark and Weisbach (1991) showed that state-level legislation reduced the market value of franchisers in their states by an average of 6.4 percent by diminishing their ability to enforce pre-existing contractual elements of their IAs dealing with franchisee termination. Of course, with perfect foresight, firms would factor these possibilities into their calculus, but this is true only in the limit.
Efficiency and Sustainable Competitive Advantage
Managing IAs properly leads to greater system efficiency and own-firm profit-essentially a momentary advantage. What about the sustainability of these gains? Sustainable competitive advantage is believed to arise from valuable positional or resource advantages that are difficult to replicate (i.e. imitate). Non-replicability has been associated with complex configurations of resources as well as the ability to dynamically adapt activities and resources more rapidly than rivals (see e.g., Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) . Consider these in turn.
Replication of advantages emanating from institutional design must involve either (1) replicating the entire efficient value system (i.e., entering with a rival system), or (2) supplanting the focal firm in its value system. For the former, developing a rival system with efficient IAs in place is clearly more complex than simply replicating the activities of a single firm, as it involves assembling an entire rival configuration of resources (i.e., partners and IAs). Such a configuration is difficult to pull together, especially when partners are scarce and/or when efficient relationships are the result of complex IAs developed over time (such as social norms). The replication of such institutions is a complex, time consuming, and in many ways uncertain task. Thus efficient systems both offer customers greater value (limiting their desire to do business with firms from a rival system), and erect a barrier due to the difficulty of forming a rival configuration of resources, which must include efficient institutions.
Turning to the replacement of a given firm in an established system, we see that it is also more difficult to supplant a focal firm in its system when complex IAs have been developed to govern exchange between firms. As above, these IAs must be formed anew upon replacement.
Furthermore, regardless of the complexity of IAs, it becomes more and more difficult to offer the other firms in a system an incentive to replace a focal firm as the system efficiency increases. To see this, note that should a firm not cooperate in creating an efficient marketing system, its partners will have strong incentives to actively seek a replacement firm. However, as the system's efficiency approaches its upper bound (given the IE and characteristics of the transactions) there is less and less to gain by replacing a partner, especially given the costs/risks when complex institutions are involved. Thus, competition between firms is essentially shifted to competition between systems, since individuals firms are difficult to supplant.
With regard to dynamic adaptation, we observe that developing IAs which allow efficient exchanges between firms in a value system will also tend to facilitate efficient adaptation.
Essentially, IAs permit reallocations which both improve efficiency in a given state, and enhance the feasibility of reallocations associated with changing activity sets over time.
THE REMEDIABLE EFFICIENCY CRITERION
We formalize the ideas above in the criterion of remediable efficiency for institutional design. To understand this concept, consider a firm in a value system in a given IE and some incumbent IA in place to support an existing activity set. The firm is contemplating a new IA that supports a new activity set that promises to deliver greater customer value (and/or reduced costs).
How should it evaluate this transition between IAs and corresponding activity sets? We offer remediable efficiency as the appropriate criterion. Drawing on Wernerfelt's (1994) efficiency criterion, it also accommodates concerns about incumbency by incorporating Williamson's (1996) notion of remediability. As an operational matter, this amounts to asking the following questions about a new IA and the activity set it allows relative to an incumbent IA and activity set.
1. Does the proposed activity set allowed by the IA increase joint profits (with reallocation, if needed)? (The joint profit requirement.)
2. Is the new IA required to support reallocation feasible given (a) the IE, and (b) the characteristics of the proposed activity set? (The reallocation feasibility requirement.)
3. Does the new IA remain feasible after accounting for switchover (setup and takedown)
costs? (The switchover feasibility requirement.)
Although stated with reference to a re-design case, these tests apply to a clean-sheet design by substituting null values for the incumbent activity set and IA. We trace the ramifications of each of the three questions in turn.
The Joint-Profit Requirement
The first requirement is the minimum joint profit standard. Unless joint profits increase, there is no possible reallocation such that all firms in the value system would approve the change.
Furthermore, if the proposed activity set is a Pareto-improving action, there is still no need to consider a new IA. Only when joint profit-enhancing actions require reallocation to align efficiency with own-profits does a new IA come into consideration. Given that a joint profit increasing IA has been identified for consideration, we now turn to its feasibility.
The Reallocation Feasibility Requirement (Part A: IE Constraints)
What types of constraints do IEs place on IA design? Recent advances in political science on the role of polities in facilitating efficiency are used to develop Table 1 that depicts the judicial, political and social elements of IEs. Each impacts IA feasibility.
Insert Table 1 Here When the polity itself is an exchange partner in a value system (as often occurs in emerging markets), private parties' weak economic property rights are subject to expropriation by the sovereign. Federal polities are more protective against expropriation in such exchanges. This expands the feasible set of IAs, especially fragile IAs. China's economic success relative to Russia is attributed to its multipolar polity. In China the central and regional governments and the military provide de facto checks and balances against each other to protect private investors in joint ventures despite the lack of an independent judiciary to enforce contractual elements of IAs (Montignola, Qian and Weingast, 1995) . In contrast the unitary polity in Russia makes foreign joint venture investors more vulnerable to unilateral changes by the polity.
The third dimension in Table 1 places social norms within the IE along a continuum of trust. Trust is defined in various, contentious ways, but the core idea is that greater trust lowers transaction costs because of greater concerns for the trading partner (Hunt, 1997) and more predictability in behavior (Bhattacharya, Devinney, and Pillutla, 1998; Williamson 1996) .
Although it is recognized that trust, trustworthiness and cooperation vary within and across societies, there is considerable debate about the meaning of these facts (e.g., Fukayama, 1995).
However, that said, the clearer the norms of cooperative behavior within an IE, the greater the scope for beneficial exchanges to go through. From our perspective, greater trust in the IE supports a larger range and diversity of relational and reputational elements of IAs.
We discuss a typology of trust-based social rules in the framework below.
The Reallocation Feasibility Requirement (Part B: Exchange Constraints)
The characteristics of the specific exchange activities on IA feasibility have been studied extensively in the transaction cost literature (Williamson, 1996) . The principal insight from this work is that specific investment by the contracting parties and uncertainty about allocations and outcomes make contracting increasingly infeasible as an IA. However, there appear to be a number of issues concerning the feasibility of IAs which are not fully explored in this literature.
Consider two such issues: Seemingly inefficient IAs and interactions between different elements of an IA.
One often observes IAs that are seemingly inefficient in one or the other respect. In one instance which has been studied, Heide and John (1988) describe manufacturers' agents with heavy specific investments in market development activities engaging in additional expenses to strengthen customer bonds above and beyond that required to develop the market for the product. The agents do this to deter their principals from expropriating their market development investments. The primary threat is unilateral termination of reps and direct sales instead.
The agents' activities seem quite inefficient on the surface. Sales managers often complain that their salespeople spend time bonding themselves with clients rather than engaging in "productive" activities like developing new business and communicating customer needs back to their principals. A seemingly more efficient alternative might envision the firm posting an interestbearing bond that is forfeited if the salesperson is dismissed inappropriately. However, given the imprecise nature of marketing activity sets, enforcement of such a bond would be problematic. In other words, the seemingly inefficient IA is nevertheless remediably efficient once the characteristics of the exchange are considered. It is the "best we can do."
Turning to interactions between contractual, ownership and social elements of IAs, we see that these are often pervasive sources of infeasibility. For instance, desired contractual elements often clash with desired ownership elements. To illustrate, ostensibly similar contracts often have disparate effects because of interactions with the ownership elements. Contrast an "independent"
insurance agent with a "direct-writing" agent. Both are typically paid on an identical commissiononly schedule. However, in ownership respects, the independent agent owns (de jure) the client list whereas the insurance company owns the client list in the direct-writing IA. A direct writing firm that owns this list cannot credibly commit to the agent that they will not to make deleterious changes to the territory. So, for instance, if a direct-writing agent grew too large, the company could split the territory. Thus, the "identical" pay plan will have a smaller incentive effect in the direct-writing IA compared to the independent agent IA.
The Switchover Feasibility Requirement
A key aspect of the remediable approach is the contention that transitions between IAs and the characteristics of the incumbent IA matter. Thus, both the setup costs of switching to the new IA, as well as the anticipated future costs of taking down that IA must be included in the remediable efficiency calculus. Feasibility of IAs is not just an matter of external factors such as the IE and exchange characteristics, but also of extant IAs.
Switchover problems are pervasive in marketing and can be traced to two principal drivers, path dependence and switching-out costs.
The simplest impact of path dependence is exhibited when the feasibility of a given new IA is affected by the particular incumbent IA present. For example, a new IA involving common ownership may be feasible or not depending on extant cultural aspects of the incumbent IA.
Broader manifestations of path dependence occur when incumbent IAs result from a series of past choices. Choices in the initial stages of the development of IAs between parties are often constrained (if only by limited information and a failure to consider alternatives). As time passes, specific investments undertaken to increase the efficiency of interaction within a given IA create a lock-in condition, and future IAs are constrained. For example, given the small volume of export sales, firms often cannot contemplate using any IA other than distributors or export agents in the early stages of international market development. Increasing returns to scale in technologyintensive markets also create such lock-in. Firms may jump on a product standard bandwagon that turns out to be technologically inferior ex post (e.g., the VHS tape format). As markets mature, other IAs may well be more profitable if the firm did not have to take down the incumbent IA.
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Thus, North's (1990) has argued that (path dependent) lock-in effects preclude us from assuming that institutions that persist must be efficient. However, we may not conclude from this extant inefficiency that new IAs (and activity sets) are necessarily better on remediable efficiency grounds. To the contrary, once switchover costs are factored in, the net gains may well be negative. Margolis and Leibowtiz (1995) show that switching tape formats today is not warranted given existing VHS-formatted tape libraries. In our language, the locked-in incumbent IA is remediably efficient (the best we can do). High-tech markets are replete with such examples.
Lock-in is sometimes designed purposely into income redistribution programs and nonprofit social service agencies serving non-paying clients. IAs in these situations are often designed in convoluted and seemingly inefficient ways. Straightforward cash payouts are often orders of magnitude cheaper than non-cash setups. The classic example is the often-criticized U.S. sugar program. Stigler (1992) estimates that it costs $3 billion annually to raise the intended beneficiaries' incomes by a mere quarter of this amount. These additional costs arise from a convoluted program with multiple agencies and oversight bodies, and an emphasis on indirect transfers. Would the often-touted alternative of a direct cash transfer payment to sugar farmers be remediably efficient?
We contend that these IAs are purposely designed to protect weak political rights by creating costs of switching out of it. Although redistribution programs are obviously favored by its beneficiaries, they represent fragile political rights subject to revision in the next election. In this regard, it is far easier to undo a direct cash payment than it is to undo a Byzantine program with multiple constituencies and indirect non-cash subsidies. Hence, a cash transfer sugar program is not remediably efficient compared to the incumbent design because of the switching-out costs designed into the current design. Put differently, the proposed alternative does not pass the switchover feasibility test. The seemingly inefficient IA design protects U.S. sugar farmers' weak political rights (to the redistributed money) just as multipolar IEs protect weak economic rights of joint venture investors in China.
Switchover costs can also arise from the power of incumbents. Recall the general argument that incumbency power shapes IAs in profound ways (McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz, 1993) . In line with this expectation, Weiss and Anderson (1992) show that firms with incumbent sales forces that they themselves consider less efficient than a proposed company sales force nevertheless often do not convert to the latter IA. Why not? A principal reason uncovered in their work is the firm's perception of the large switching costs associated with conversion.
Among these costs is retaliation from the terminated distributors, either individually or collectively. Switching sometimes requires buying out entrenched incumbents at a price that renders the new IA unattractive. In our terminology, once these additional costs are factored in, the proposed "superior" alternative is not remediably efficient.
Of course, when evaluating a proposed IA, managers are often able to anticipate lock-in effects which may result. If these are not desirable (as opposed to the examples above) then the remediable efficiency of the IA is lessened by the anticipated costs of switch-out and loss of flexibility.
In sum, switchover costs and incumbent IA characteristics loom large in the remediable efficiency calculus. We shall see later that much of the prospective gain from designing IAs carefully and with foresight is the avoidance of lock-in traps as well as making (or attempting in vain) unwarranted switches out of "best-we-can-do" locked-in positions.
A FRAMEWORK FOR DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS
In this section we address the important practical problem of designing appropriate institutional structures by proposing a framework for managers. The framework begins with a consideration of the desired outputs of the marketing value system (i.e. customer benefits) and the activity sets required to bring about these outcomes. Then, we design contractual, ownership and social elements of IAs that support these joint profit maximizing (JPM) activity sets according to our remediable efficiency tests.
We proceed in a staged manner-moving from contractual to ownership to social (relational and reputational elements) elements of the IA. This sequencing is deliberate. We hold to the idea that institutional design proceeds from the simple to the complex-complexity should be just enough and no more. Where feasible, contracting poses the least complex IA design problem, as it uses fine-grained support from the IE judiciary and polity to bind parties to joint profit maximizing activity sets. Ownership is more complex than contracting as it only relies on coarse support from the IE judiciary and polity and requires IA-specific re-alignment of ownership with investment to support JPM activity sets (see below). Social elements of IAs are even more complex to develop, as they depend minimally on the IE polity and judiciary and almost entirely on norms in the IE and IA to support JPM activity sets. In keeping with our overall approach, simpler social rules are considered before more complex ones.
As a running example in this section, we will illustrate the design of a recycling system for newspapers. Such an endeavor involves a mix of profit, non-profit and governmental actors, so it affords an opportunity to illustrate the process across non-traditional contexts. Figure 2 provides an overview of the formulation.
Insert Figure 2 Here
The Value Creation System
Outputs The value system in Figure 1 delivers a set of desired outputs that can be represented by a vector of end-user valued attributes. This is standard practice for marketers and we possess powerful choice modeling tools to accomplish this by segment or even individual customers. In the extant example of the recycling system, the ease of use, the reliability of pick-up, the psychological comfort felt by the "green" customer, etc. are the vector of valued outputs for the individual household customer. To the city government, relevant outputs of a vendor might include the ability to accommodate growth, adherence to sound environmental practices, etc.
The key for institutional design is to identify the degree to which each output is: a) difficult to measure/verify (ex ante and/or ex post), and b) foreseeably subject to revision. Both economic and political perspectives matter in this assessment. From an economic perspective, attributes like pick-up times are relatively easy to measure/monitor, but adherence to environmentally-friendly methods of disposal and handling of the trash mixed in with the recyclables is harder to ascertain. Similarly, desired capacity is an attribute that is likely to require revision into the future.
From a political perspective, an attribute is foreseeably subject to revision if political consensus is weak regarding rights to that output. Thus, while the beneficiaries of a cash grant may support the transfer payment very strongly, other people may not do so and rescind this grant in the future. In our recycling system example, an output like "adherence to sound environmental practices" is a weak political right subject to revision since consensus is often lacking on this issue. Controversies over preferences for activities like burning vs. landfill disposal of unsold newsprint highlight weak political rights.
Investments Investments are expenditures in people, information, equipment, and procedures that are incurred ahead of the actual operational activities that generate valued outputs. In our example, garbage-hauling trucks, sorting plants, training specialists in auction markets (to get rid of the recycled newsprint, etc.), garbage burning plants, and landfills are all relevant investments.
From an institutional design standpoint, the key is to identify the degree to which each investment is: a) difficult to measure/verify, b) specific to the intended task/parties to the transaction, and c) transferable in ownership across parties. Again, both economic and political perspectives matter in this assessment.
Readily verifiable investments include garbage burners, and trucks, while training and quality processes, and R&D are less verifiable investments in our example. More specific assets are defined as possessing lower value in alternative uses compared to its originally intended purpose. They are open to the sort of opportunism highlighted in the transaction cost economics literature (Williamson, 1996) . In the current example, garbage trucks are fairly non-specific assets, but a garbage burning plant sited next to a recycling facility is much more specific.
Finally, more readily transferable (or alienable) assets are those where ownership (de jure or de facto) can be transferred from one party to another without much difficulty or loss in value given the IE. For instance, the garbage trucks can be readily transferred from one party (e.g., a fleet operator) to the recycling operator. In contrast, tacit assets, such as a process for separating glossy coated paper from newsprint, that was acquired through years of experimentation and learning-by-doing is much more difficult to transfer at low cost from one party (e.g., the inventor) to the recycling plant operator. Likewise, a plant operators' expertise is an asset whose ownership cannot be readily transferred. We caution these are not fixed, exogenous characteristics. Expert systems and process documentation are means by which such knowledge-based assets (or knowhow) are made more alienable (Brynjolfsson, 1993) .
Political aspects of investments are also important in this assessment. Investments made by the polity magnify specificity and alienability problems for private investments. Normally, state investments are made either when private parties do not have sufficient funds (e.g., welfare
clients) or when market prices do not suffice to cover costs (e.g., newsprint recycling). The problem is that when the state is a party to the exchange, its sovereign power makes it more difficult to commit credibly not to expropriate their exchange partners' investments by changing the terms of trade unilaterally. Studies of public utilities in the United States (Troeksen, 1997) and overseas (Levy and Spiller, 1994) show compelling evidence of this problem. In our example, a privately financed garbage burner whose client is the municipal government faces ex post hazards of downward revision in the prices paid for their services.
Effort Effort represents costly activities undertaken by the relevant actors in connection with the investments identified above in order to produce the attributes desired by the user segment(s). In our example, the diligence of the truck drivers, the actions of the garbage plant operators, and the selling activities of the recycled newsprint salespeople are all relevant effortful activities. From an institutional design standpoint, the key is to identify the degree to which these relevant efforts are:
a) difficult to measure/verify, and b) foreseeably subject to revision.
More verifiable effort are those matters where an after-the-fact inspection of results or audits can reveal to a third-party referee that an action was indeed undertaken at some level. For instance, the time taken to complete a fixed recycling pick-up route is a good measure of the effort of the garbage truck driver. In contrast, the separation of glossy insert from newsprint by employees at the collection facility is less verifiable since the pre-collection separation by households has a large impact on the final result achieved at the recycling station.
Designing Contracting Elements of IAs
The contractible subset refers to those attributes, investments and efforts that are not subject to verifiability, specificity, ownership transfer and revision problems (see Table 2 ). As such, they can be supported through suitably devised contracting elements. Such contractual elements trump ownership and social elements of IAs in that they are more easily erected, if feasible. Both standard-form contracts, and complex, contingent contracts can be written to support this sub-set. The primary design challenge is to ensure the contracts provide the parties with the proper incentives to independently implement desired activities, as discussed. There is a wealth of research on mechanism design to inform us about the design of such contractual elements.
Potential contractual elements are assessed with our three-part test for remediable efficiency. Recall the first test is a joint profit-increase requirement for the proposed activity set. This is fairly straightforward, with one twist. In a non-profit setting like our recycling example, the joint profit test becomes a joint cost test since the absence of well-functioning markets for recycled newsprint makes it inevitable that the program will lose money (absent subsidies).
Assuming that net gains are available, the reallocation feasibility and switchover feasibility tests are applied. We cannot exhaustively discuss the impact of all aspects of IEs and exchanges on IA feasibility. Instead, we offer some illustrations of each below.
Part (a) of our reallocation feasibility test assesses IE support for required reallocations.
One implication of this test is the following: Given IE support for property rights of nominal owners, arms-length bidding is the preferred contractual form to support required investments. This is true even if increasing economies of scale result in a natural monopoly. For example, an investor contemplating buying a fleet of garbage trucks to bid for the business of picking up recyclables would be confident of re-selling his equipment in the resale market at fair value should his bid fail or his contract later be terminated. Efficient bidding formats can be quite complex. For instance, we know that "second-price" (Vickery) auctions are more efficient than lowest price auctions, and are coming into use in sophisticated firms and government agencies.
The support from the IE is particularly fragile when the polity itself is a direct participant in the value system. In these cases, a world of pseudo contracts may arise. In our example, a contract may allow a municipality to reprice its payments to a recycling operation based on the threat of external bidding even though such bidding may never have taken place. While such a contract may appear flawed, observe that this pseudo-contractual IA may still be remediably efficient given the reasons for the direct involvement of the polity (such as an inadequate market price for recycled newsprint to cover the costs of the operation). The IA allows a recycling operation to be supported yet benchmarks payments to the operator based on a market-like mechanism.
Part (b) of the second test assesses feasibility given the exchange characteristics themselves. Consider outputs, efforts and investments. Verifiable output, such as the time to complete a pick-up route, offer obvious opportunities to devise contracting elements. More importantly, advances in contract design can be used to devise complex, contingent contracts for unverifiable effort provided the output is verifiable. The core idea is to devise pay-for-performance elements in the IA.
However, when unverifiable effort is paired with unverifiable output, this forces transactions outside the realm of pay-for-performance contracts. For instance, the observable output of operators who separate glossy paper from newsprint is not decomposable from the efforts of more diligent pre-sorting by households. Paying plant operators on a performance basis is infeasible.
Investment transferability is another exchange-level constraint on contractual feasibility.
For instance, the operator of the recycling facility would be nervous about investing time and effort in R&D to improve the sorting process since the ownership of this tacit know-how is relatively difficult to transfer/sell separately from the plant itself, should such a sale become necessary (perhaps due to the contract with the municipality coming up for rebid). However, if the process was separable from the specific site and could be licensed to other operators, the operator would be more responsive to contracts rewarding such investment (e.g. pay-for-performance).
Our third test assesses switchover costs. Proposed contractual elements may not be feasible because entrenched incumbents may capture most if not all of the gains. For instance, a firm may purchase a service on a bid basis, and require multiple bids on each re-purchase occasion. Yet, non-incumbent bidders may not bid aggressively since they fear that the buyer will factor in switching costs that favor the incumbent vendor. If there is any uncertainty attached to the gains, the net expected gains after overcoming this inertia may not be sufficiently attractive to the non-incumbent. Industry observers suggest that many out-sourced information services purchases fit this scenario. In remediable efficiency language, the original bidding system design (an IA) did not take into account the takedown costs on future occasions. Once this is factored in, bidding at repurchase is no longer RE improving. If adopted in the first place, the bidding system should be replaced with a more efficient institution to protect the buyers interests.
Improving Measurement Effective measurement of value received and cost incurred is a sine qua non of contractual exchange, and efforts to improve measurement can expand the contractible subset. Historically, contractual exchange has been fostered by the development of specialized monitors in the form of private and public/legal rules. Commonly agreed upon weights and measures, and repositories of reputation like the "Law Merchants" of medieval Europe are examples of institutions designed to improve measurement. Contemporary institutions devoted to measurement and information brokering include the various standards organizations that are so vital to the electronics industry. Although the significance of standards is well recognized, it is less clear how to order the relative capabilities of alternative types of standards bodies. For instance, mandated versus voluntary standards organizations often co-exist but are rarely studied.
The feasibility of contracting is directly linked to the parties' inability to measure costs and values. Ergo, the development of more complex contingent contracting elements can be traced to parties' abilities to resolve the measurement problem. Thus it is likely not a coincidence that the relatively recent movement toward external contracting over internal bureaucracy has gone handin-hand with the development of information technology, communication systems, and flexible manufacturing technologies. Such process innovations allow for both separation and focus and guarantees and control.
For example, the measurement of advertising agency performance (a neglected topic) is a classic example where IAs have been deficient before improvements in measurement "technologies" have led to a separation of validation from execution. Historically, advertisers relied on the agency to both develop the advertising and place it in the media. However, the development of sophisticated advertising monitoring systems, the advent of real-time customer tracking programs, and the development of independent media purchasing agencies, have remedied the inability to measure agency performance, at least to some extent.
How do we judge measurement improvement? Although more precise measurement appears to be an unqualified good (how could better data hurt?), our RE criterion evokes a more stringent test for moving to an IA with more precise measurements. The principal roadblock in incorporating a more precise measurement technology is the switchover feasibility test applied to the new IA.
For instance, the widespread use of point-of-sale scanners in grocery stores makes it technically feasible to better control inventories and stock-outs. This is the premise behind "efficient consumer response" (ECR) in the food industry. However, to realize these gains, it is necessary to shift the responsibility for store-level inventories to the vendor. Some retailers, and wholesalers, view vendor-managed inventory systems with deep suspicion, and overcoming this problem has proven to be the key hurdle in implementing ECR. From our viewpoint, unless the prospective joint gains can be reallocated through a suitable IA, a move to ECR is not remediably efficient.
Another arena where better measurement is not always RE improving are non-profit agencies. There is a growing tendency to introduce pay-for-performance contracting elements into non-profit IAs with the aim of making them more "efficient" on the grounds that the non-profit motivations of these agencies are insufficient to motivate cost-efficient behavior. Actually, the choice of a non-profit IA is indicative of strong non-contractibility problems in the first place, so we might expect tensions between the pay-for-measured-performance aspect of the revised IA and the special goals of non-profits.. Indeed, one study (Cragg, 1997) found that introducing payfor-performance for employment training providers has the unintended effect of shifting the providers' focus to easier to place clients. Put differently, pay-for-performance is not an RE improving remedy for the apparent inefficiency of the provider agency (i.e. because the performance itself is non-contractible). Treating non-profit agencies as if the non-contractual elements of the IA did not matter is wrong. Improvements rest on identifying RE improvements.
In summary, exchanges from the contractible subset can, and should, be organized using contractual elements. Mechanism design (of which agency theory is one variant) offer useful, though complex, solutions to this design challenge. Improvements in measurement increase the contractible subset, and should be sought, provided they are tested against the feasibility standards for remediable efficiency, and not just against the joint profit standard.
Designing Ownership Elements of IAs
The next level of complexity in IA design is used to cope with those outputs, investments and efforts in the non-contractible subset for which feasible contractual elements cannot be specified satisfactorily. In this section, we study the possibility of (re)organizing ownership as a means to redistribute profits in support of activities generating greater joint profits.
Ownership Reorganization The incomplete contracting work of Grossman and Hart (1986) defines IAs solely on the basis of the ownership pattern, and traces all the remediable efficiency differences between IAs to their ability to offer investment incentives via ownership of the relevant investment/asset. The general argument is that an IA featuring an ownership pattern that confers stronger property rights on a particular investing party will evoke higher levels of investment from that party, especially for non-redeployable investments. Although this may appear an innocuous rule, it is more complex when set in our framework which considers also the influence of the IE (as emphasized by North, 1990 ) and alternative (contractual and social) IAs (as articulated by Williamson, 1996) .
To illustrate the interaction of these elements, many branded product companies engage in taper integration (partial vertical ownership) in less developed countries (e.g., China or India), with the express purpose of controlling and avoiding expropriation by self-interest seeking distribution companies. This is done solely because of the inability of the owner of the brand to enforce distribution contracts in these IEs. There is little doubt that these companies view ownership as a second best response to poor contract enforcement in the IE (see, e.g., Vanhonacker, 1997) .
Ownership rights as we consider them consist of far more than a simple claim to residual income (as is traditionally the case in the agency theory and contracting literature). Ownership of an asset is the (de facto) ability to redirect its use and can be separated from claims to residual income. Indeed, residual income (or at least some fraction of it) can be contracted to another person (as would be the case with mortgage backed securities, for example). To illustrate, reconsider the independent insurance agent versus the direct-writing insurance rep. Although the two are paid in nominally identical fashion with a share of income generated, (a pure commission plan), the former "owns" the client list. The direct-writing rep does not "own" the list and thus cannot redirect its use. Instead this discretion belongs to the firm.
Giving the ownership of the list to the agent secures the agent's investments in developing and servicing his client base, but evokes less investment by the firm in complimentary assets (e.g. building brand image). Why? When in the non-contractible subset, the value created by investments and efforts of the parties in the value system is divided through bargaining. If the firm were to own the list, the rep would be in a decidedly disadvantageous bargaining position. Thus, absent effective ownership of the list (or asset more generally), the rep would reduce its investment preemptively; and the same is true of the firm. In reaching this conclusion, Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that individuals are equally self-interested in alternative institutions and no superior auditing and/or measurement properties attach to different institutional forms. Thus, firms are no more capable of supervising their employees than their independent reps. Therefore, it is the ability to direct the use of the asset ex post that matters. Notice that some loss occurs in all cases. Why? Ownership is a blunt instrument, and it dulls the non-owner's incentives (unlike contracting in the contractible subset). Consider applying this rule to ownership of advertisements. Devinney and Dowling (forthcoming) show that in the case of the agency-advertiser relationship, both the agency and client would be better off if the agency could claim greater "ownership" in the relationship-in other words, if the agency bought out the client (and its brands)! Of course, this is infeasible given the switchover costs. However, transferring copyrights to the intellectual property (i.e. advertisement) itself from the creator to the client is quite feasible as witnessed in book publishing.
Although ownership favoring the more "important" investor improves value creation and passes our first test for RE improvement-the joint profit criterion-such re-arrangements may not always pass the second and third tests-the reallocation feasibility and switchover feasibility tests. Regarding reallocation feasibility, it may be impossible to credibly transfer ownership given the nature of the exchange and/or the IE. Regarding switchover feasibility, the path to the new IA may be too costly to one of the partners.
Ownership reallocation feasibility is especially an issue when knowledge or information assets are the subject matter of the exchange. These assets are difficult to transfer even when efficiency considerations dictate it. At one level, transferring ownership to the "right" person is difficult because of the "public good" nature of some know-how. For example, Michelin has refused to engage in anything but direct overseas investment and maintains an almost fanatical level of secrecy. Their claim is that production technologies that took decades to develop can be stolen with little effort. On the other hand, corporate knowledge can be so complex and embedded that causal ambiguity makes transference impossible without time and effort. For example, Chaparral Steel found its expansion options limited by the fact that it could think of no way other than through personal experience and training to create a new facility (Leonard-Barton, 1996) .
Importantly, these are not immutable, exogenous characteristics. First, the nature of the asset may be changed to make it more transportable. Documentation and high bandwidth communications are one example. A second response is a "private ordering" solution where the formal IE support from the Uniform Commercial Code etc., is supplemented by judicial support or forbearance towards non-standard and seemingly one-sided agreements. The success of business format franchising as an institution demonstrates that a fragile, intangible asset (a brand name) can be effectively "rented" out in return for local managerial effort despite all the problems inherent with such an exchange. The hallmark of franchise systems is the seemingly one-sided and "unfair" control of franchisees' operations and fragile ownership rights of franchisees. These features are key to making franchising an RE improving alternative to corporate ownership. Since such fragile ownership patterns are unlikely to be supported in poorly endowed IEs, franchising companies expanding into such nations will find more robust ownership patterns to be the IAs of choice under the RE criterion.
Ownership reallocation feasibility is especially complex when one party is the state or polity. Consider, for instance, the alternative ownership arrangements for the non-contractible investments of our newsprint recycling example, viz. investor-owned, regulated, and publicly owned facilities. With investor-owned facilities, the polity asks for bids from private investors to serve the market as an exclusive territory franchise. In other words, the market is "owned" by the winning bidder for a fixed term.
Such a transfer is not feasible in this case. Why? It is especially difficult for a local government to credibly claim not to expropriate the franchise asset's value-for example, by refusing to allow price increases as energy costs rise (e.g., Troekson, 1997) . It is more credible for a multi-polar polity such as the state government and the municipal government to jointly make such claims. The Enron utility plant fiasco in India illustrates this point. There, electric power is a purely central government matter, and the original agreements were voided by a newly elected central government when a more potent provincial government might have prevented it.
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The second ownership alternative relies on the creation of a quasi-judicial regulatory board with some independence from the polity. Is this feasible? That depends on the IE. Federal polities and de jure judiciaries are a necessity to create credible regulatory regimes if we look at the evidence across nations (Levy and Spiller, 1994) .
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The third alternative is public ownership of the immobile non-contractible resources coupled with bids from private operators to operate the facilities on a performance-contracting basis. However, as we noted before, different institutional forms possessing similar incentive structures will lead to similar outputs. Hence, public or private ownership in this case does little to solve the incentive problem. Matching public ownership of the fixed assets with private ownership of their operation resolves the monopoly pricing incentive created by the single operator but does little to alleviate the investment incentive problem. This is identical to the problem of the directwriting insurance firm that wished to use commission-only pay as an incentive. Ownership of the relevant assets blunts the incentive effect of the pay contract.
In summary, ownership favoring the more important investor typically passes the first RE test, but the feasibility and switchover tests are more stringent. Applying the feasibility test to our recycling case, the regulated utility is the least complex, but still feasible alternative.
Designing the Social Elements of IAs
We have seen that when contracting becomes infeasible, ownership structure adjustment is the least complex alternative IA to support more efficient proposed activity sets. However, the desired ownership pattern may also be infeasible in the "non-ownership subset," as was shown above. We turn now to the consideration of social elements under these circumstances.
There are a bewildering array of social rules that can be found in different parts of the world. We focus on efficient social norms that support joint profit maximizing activity sets.
Efficiency of social rules is explained by invoking the threat of being "shunned" by the network.
This provides a powerful incentive for self-policing since the actions of one transgressor is a "public bad" borne by all with whom the transgressor is associated. The desire of the participants to continue to expand trading leads to an incentive to protect one's reputation.
On the other hand, entry into the network will be difficult and can lead to an inefficient over reliance on less qualified insiders. For example, the famed Benetton system of subcontracting is highly flexible within the European and North Italian context from which it sprung, but has proven to be a serious constraint on the company's ability to expand effectively outside Europe.
In fact, prominent scholars (e.g. North 1990 ) argue that social rules are more likely than not to be inefficient because the path dependence of social rules tends to perpetuate incumbency.
He points to long-lived social rules of the Suq markets of North Africa to illustrate his point. In the contemporary marketing context, we find that advertising self-regulatory bodies serve less to control quality and more to protect agencies from clients and prying outsiders. Thus social rules are both complex to set-up as well as take down.
In order to isolate on plausibly efficient social rules, we focus on trust-based norms that can bind parties to JPM activity sets. Trust can operate at the level of a specific exchange (relational) or derive from a broader (reputational) level. Thus, we consider network arrangements (e.g., the theory of clubs; Ellickson, 1991), reputation bonding (Devinney and Dowling, forthcoming), personal ties (e.g., the Chinese tradition of guanxi) and other trust-based social rules as informal next best alternatives to contractual and ownership-based economic guarantees. 5 To incorporate these trust-based social elements into our design framework, we devise the following typology of trust-based social rules.
Insert Figure 3 Here If we scale up from dyadic ties, multiple individuals in a tight network sometimes devise complex, but efficient social rules; e.g., like those developed by the New England whaling community in the 19th century for determining disputed ownership of whales caught on the high seas. Quaint expressions like the "fast fish" rule and "iron-holds-the-whale" rule are analyzed by Ellickson (1991) to show how they supported efficient whale-hunting.
Even more complex are the efficient social rules developed by more amorphous communities. Clay (1997) describes the "merchant coalitions" among American traders in
Mexican California in the 1830s after independence from Spain. The core feature of the coalition is reciprocal dealing among loosely defined "members" (i.e., taking turns as agents and principals). Enforcement for rule breaking was completely informal and confined to a partial loss of future business.
This example is particularly revealing about the power of efficient social rules because the pre-existing Mexican legal system did not allow for enforcement of civil contracts. Thus, only the coalition's informal rules governed the trade between resident merchants who bought hides (and other products) from ranchers and manufactured goods from ships. Ships' captains sold on credit, as did ranchers. Given fluctuating prices, and the lack of a legal system, the adaptation needs were obviously severe. Clay (1997) concludes these rules were efficient by observing the huge increases in trade concomitant with the growth of the coalition. His analysis also highlights the ambiguous antecedents of the developments of these efficient rules. Path dependence could well have developed them along inefficient lines (such as the Mexican system that preceded it).
Even more complex than the reputation-based rules are the efficient quasi-legal social rules devised to support exchange involving multiple parties separated by place, time, and circumstances in "communities" that are even looser than the geographically-constrained California merchant coalitions. The "merchant law system" of private courts and judges organized by European merchants in the Middle Ages and later is an example of such a form. Unlike the merchant coalition, this system used specialists who served as arbitrators, adjudicators and enforcers of the rules (North, 1990) . Present-day arbitrators whose decisions are binding on the parties represent contemporary examples of such "private law". They apply principles uniquely crafted to the specific industry or context and are thus capable of supporting more activity sets.
Remediable Efficiency and Social Elements To begin, we reiterate that formal contracting rules and/or ownership setups tend to be more powerful institutional forms compared to these informal social forms (see North (1990) on the limits of social rules). The available evidence shows that informal social rules are typically trumped by formal legal systems. For instance, the American annexation of California in 1846, which brought an enforceable contract law with it, led to the demise of the merchant coalition described earlier. Likewise, the European merchant law systems ultimately evolved into codified law. The reader may note that we are considerably more cautious about the roles and influence of social institutions than recent papers in marketing on trust (e.g., Morgan and Hunt, 1994) . We feel this way especially when norms supporting social exchange must be purposefully developed. Our view softens somewhat when the IE is endowed with preexisting norms. This alleviates complexities associated with actually developing norms to support a given exchange, leaving only complexities involved in social enforcement. Note that while the impact of norms and trust have been studied considerably, there has been far less attention given to the important issue of how these are to be developed, intentionally, by managers.
The general principle then is that informal social rules are warranted under the RE criterion only when a simpler form is demonstrably insufficient and the more complex form is implementable. Proposed social rules can be assessed with our familiar three-part test for remediable efficiency.
The first test is a joint profit-increase requirement for the proposed activity set. This test was quite innocuous for contractual and ownership elements, and this is true here as well.
The second test has two parts, feasibility given support from the IE, and feasibility given characteristics of the exchange. Consider them in turn. The support from the IE for using an informal social rule turns entirely on the pre-existing norms in the IE. Thus, we cannot simply bring the merchant coalition into existence one day. Instead, we have to start with the simplest social rules in our typology (dyadic reciprocity), and scale up as time goes on. Thus, relational dyads eventually coalesce into a network. Once formed, pre-existing networks can always be used to good advantage, however, as alluded to above.
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The second part of the feasibility test dealt with the characteristics of the exchange. Are there particular characteristics that make proposed social elements ill-suited to support the associated activity sets? Yes. Outputs, investments and effort that are foreseeably subject to substantial revision do not sit well with the highly path-dependent nature of informal social rules.
Rapid obsolescence requires taking down existing activity sets, which is not easy to do with social rules. For instance, in our recycling case, the preferred technology for environmentally sound disposal is subject to frequent change. Hence, investments in a garbage burner are not well supported with informal social rules. Research and development is the generic category most affected by this pressure of obsolescence.
Switchover problems are likely to be the principal roadblock with proposed social elements of IAs. Moving away from one social rule to another may well evoke anger and some loss of solidarity. This is compounded by the path-dependence of social rules, whose legitimacy is wholly dependent on precedence. An added difficulty is that we know very little about the process of designing and implementing a wholesale social institution, thus incremental changes tend to prevail over wholesale changes in social rules.
Even though social institutions offer flexibility over contracting and ownership in many circumstances, it is not the case that observed social rules are always, or even mostly, efficient.
Although trust generally improves support for JPM activity sets, the RE tests require us to emphasize social rules as a "last resort" to more simple, manageable IAs.
CONCLUSIONS The Value of Institutional Thinking for Researchers
Fruitful speculation on the nature of the evolution of marketing institutions in the next century will alter the way marketing academics approach the study of marketing. We focus on motivating empirical work, which is conspicuously rare in this area. Absent empirical follow-up, our framework will be no more successful than previous efforts to take institutions seriously. One advantage is that we have been able to capitalize on several strands of work that have emerged recently.
The remediable efficiency criterion at the heart of our approach emphasizes the need to design institutions which are efficient in a joint profit sense, which also distribute gains so that each party has incentives to implement its "assigned" activities, which are also feasible given constraints of the broader IE and characteristics of the exchange, and which are also achievable in that firms can "get there" from incumbent arrangements. This is a detailed requirement which diverges significantly from prior approaches, including those based on efficiency. We offer a few avenues for research which follow from our discussion: 6. Changing the value creation system. One important insight from our discussion is that the characteristics of the production system may be partially endogenous (e.g., information assets may be transformed to more alienable forms). To what extent is this a viable option, and when is it easier to modify characteristics of the production system rather than the IA?
7. Shifting competition to the system-level. We have discussed how a network of firms linked by a set of IAs may enjoy certain sustainable advantages due to the difficulty faced by entrants in developing similar IA-linked networks and the flexibility garnered from efficient institutional ties. An interesting question is the degree to which particular IAs are more or less imitable than others, and whether managers can strategically select institutions which, though more difficult to establish, are also more difficult to imitate, as a means of establishing a positional advantage in the realm of institutions.
8. Institutional arrangements with powerful partners. Our efficiency focus emphasized the need for proposed changes to increase the profits of each firm effected in the marketing value system. However, power played an important role both in terms of how the gains in excess of this participation constraint were divided, and in terms of the credibility of 
The Value of Institutional Thinking for Managers
Practicing marketing managers have had a far greater appreciation for the value of institutional structures and their influence than marketing theorists and academics. This may be partially attributed to the willingness of practitioners to accept ambiguity they cannot explain and the tendency of academics to avoid messy details that fall outside the power of elegant theory.
However, the understanding that managers have about institutional structures is arbitrary and superstitious in the sense that it is adaptive and contextual. For example, most managers have historically over emphasized the importance of joint venture and alliance structures for global market expansion, failing to understand the ability that more sophisticated ownership and contractual arrangements can play in mitigating risk and ensuring long run success (e.g., Vanhonacker, 1997) .
Perhaps the most critical recommendation we can make is to emphasize the importance that managers need to place of total system maximization. It is fundamentally important to select 33 strategies with an eye towards maximizing joint value across the marketing value system. All too often managers are concerned solely about the implications of a set of activities on their bailiwick. This is perhaps best illustrated by the "more control/ownership is good" mentality. At one level this is completely rational. However, at the strategic level, top management must separate, to the extent possible, the issue of system maximization-what we call the joint profit maximum-from the distribution of the net rents from the activity set. Placing oneself in the shoes of the firm not having control or ownership is a simple means to understand why they too may need to share in control and/or ownership to maximize the size of the "pie" created in the system.
A pervasive tendency in managerial decision making is to reject options as infeasible too
early in the decision making process. The application of remedial efficiency separates institutional thinking into three separate and ordered component parts: the system's profitability, the allocation of that profitability, and transition from the old to the new institutional configuration. The framework in Figure 2 expanded these basic points into a process model for designing institutions.
We end our discussion with some illustrative design principles for managers:
1. Contracting trumps ownership, which trumps informal social rules. There is an ordered hierarchy of the internalization of institutional structures that should be considered in sequence. Social rules are less complex, however, when the pre-exist between two firms or in the IE.
2. Devise pay-for-performance for contractible subsets, but not other for other sets.
Incentive contracts fail to the degree that the measurement is weak and to the extent that measurement is weak, ownership and social rules dominate contracting. Hence, one should avoid attempting to incentivize culture and ownership.
3. Ownership dulls incentives, so it should go to more important investor. Ownership presents its own moral hazard problem in situations where there is more than one owner.
Hence managerial control should reside in the set of most important investors. 
